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Abstract
Evaluation of corrupt activities is incrementally based on administration of ques-
tionnaires to firms in business, and generally involves a large number of items. Data
collected by questionnaires of this type can be analyzed by Latent Class (LC) models in
order to classify firms into homogeneous groups according to the perception of corrup-
tion. In this paper, we propose a multidimensional framework, based on an LC model,
to identify various types of corruption. By using a dataset for transition economies,
we identify four classes of corrupt activities, which go beyond the usual classification
into administrative and political types of corruption; we then validate our estimates
by using a direct administrative corruption index from the same dataset and by com-
paring, at country level, corruption perception rankings published by Transparency
International. The potential of the proposed approach is illustrated through an ap-
plication to the relationship between firms’ competitiveness and the identified latent
corruption classes, with evident heterogeneity in the interpretation of results regarding
policy implications.
Keywords: Latent class models, multidimensional item response theory, corruption,
transition economies.
JEL Classification: C51 C52 D22 D73
1 Introduction
Corruption is one of the most important, and yet complex, issues facing a large number
of countries throughout the world1. Several papers have paid increased attention to the
underlying causes and consequences of corruption, as well as to assessment of political action
in the pursuit of its reduction, which affects the economic development of a country (see, for
a review, Harstad and Svensson 2008; Lambsdorff 2007). However, little attention has been
given to the methodological question of how corruption is estimated and whether any such
results can bias empirical facts and policy suggestions2. The lack of research is surprising,
as the answer to this question is critical to an understanding of why corruption persists at
all, and why it appears to be increasing over time in some parts of the world.
This paper analyses corruption, with particular focus on identifying the latent traits of
this multidimensional phenomenon. Corruption mostly occurs in a latent manner. Accord-
ing to Svensson (2005), corruption is linked with a country’s legal, economic, cultural and
political institutions, and is a response to either beneficial or harmful regulations. Corrupt
activities may arise in response to benevolent regulations when individuals pay bribes to
avoid penalties for harmful conduct or when monitoring is insufficient3. In any case, corrup-
tion is a crime which goes unnoticed by its victims, and offenders who have no incentive to
make their corrupt transactions public, conducting them clandestinely (Graeff 2005).
We exploit item responses from the Business Environment Survey 2002 (BEEPS), po-
tentially linked with corrupt practices, and examine whether a heterogeneous framework of
corruption arises across countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia. We examine whether
the dimensional structure of corruption can help to identify latent classes and whether they
can explain the weight of different types of corruption at country level. We use this sample
of microdata because it includes countries which have known heterogeneous corruption levels
and which was experiencing transition toward freer markets.
Our paper is in line with the criticism of the excessively narrow current definition of
1Rose-Ackerman (2004) estimates that total bribes in a year are about 3% of the world GDP.
2For a discussion on the problematic interpretation of the corruption index, see Dreher and Schneider
(2006).
3Conversely, Djankov et al. (1977) identify the probable increase of corruption in bad policies or inefficient
institutions.
2
corruption, characterized by the misuse of public power for private benefit4. Svensson (2005)
argues that this definition leaves open so many conceptual ambiguities. For example, the
term ”private benefit” describes receiving money or assets of value, but may also involve
an increase in political power or status, some kind of advantage from receiving promises for
future favors, or benefits for close persons (nepotism or favoritism). In addition, public power
is exercised by both bureaucrats and politicians in a large variety of sectors and behaviors
(Lambsdorff, 2007).
While economic literature in recent years has assessed the effects of corruption, the exist-
ing evidence on exactly what corruption measures (or how it is measured) is sparse. There
are two lines of research: one states that corruption is a distinct part of the quality of gov-
ernance. By using different outcomes of the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), Licht
et al. (2007) interpret separate regressions as additional evidence that the quality of gov-
ernance differs from the concept of corruption. The second line focuses on the components
of corruption. Beyond mere corruption indicators, at least two substantial categories of pub-
lic corruption exist, defined as political corruption and administrative corruption (Bardhan,
1997, 2006; Warren, 2004). However, the difficulty in building these indicators - for example,
the corruption perception index (CPI) of Transparency International (TI) - is that their
aggregation from numerous sources is essentially a summary of row-specific indices linked
with corruption, with no exploration of the dimensionality of the underlying data (Thomas,
2007)5. These criticisms may also be extended to the argument of Mocan (2008), who stated
that corruption is strictly a latent phenomenon and that this feature indicates the need for a
statistical identification. As a novelty in this literature, Neumann and Graeff (2010) showed
the existence of multi-traits in corruption, so that the endogeneity issues in empirical studies
could be reinterpreted in regression specifications as a question of dimensionality.
Based on latent class (LC) analysis (Goodman, 1974, 1978) and Item Response The-
ory (IRT) (Hambleton, 1996), in this work we use the statistical methodology proposed by
Bartolucci (2007) to characterize the role played by the dimensionality of the items in the
questionnaire and to identify the heterogeneous components of corrupt activities. This meth-
4For a discussion of various definitions of corruption, see Lambsdorff (2007).
5See the discussion of Andersson and Heywood (2009) on the use and abuse of Transparency Interna-
tional’s approach to measuring corruption.
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odology is called multidimensional IRT (M-IRT). The statistical model is used to extract
the dimensional structure correlated to the latent phenomenon (corruption) from a set of
items; this framework is then used to identify latent classes and determine corruption quant-
itatively. The M-IRT model includes the well-known multidimensional Rasch model (Rasch,
1961) as a restricted case.
There are alternative techniques for inferring a measurement scale of corruption from a
list of pre-ordered (or pre-classified) items of the questionnaire. One basic approach is the
sum score technique, which consists simply of a weighed - or not weighed - summing up of
the indicators. Factor analysis techniques are also widely used to check whether a set of
items fits a unidimensional measurement scale. Factor analyses are performed by examining
the pattern of correlations (or covariance) between the observed measures. Measures which
are highly correlated (either positively or negatively) are probably influenced by the same
factors, whereas those which are relatively uncorrelated are probably influenced by different
factors6. However, as a main advantage, the M-IRT model allows us to generate a consistent
measurement index jointly with estimating its determinants. In particular, the items used
for generating the index are selected on the basis of their reliability and their ability to
describe predominant traits.
The IRT model has already been applied to other research areas. It was initially used in
psychometrics and educational testing to investigate the latent traits of ability/achievement
tests (see Bock, 1997). However, our paper also draws on literature increasingly being
applied to social and economic measures containing items, which are scored in dichotomous
or polytomous fashion. Cappellari and Jenkins (2007) applied the IRT model to account
for several issues concerning the derivation of deprivation scales of widely used sum-score
deprivation indices. Similar methods were used by Kuklys (2004) to analyze housing and
health functioning and Faye et al. (2009) used a set of food insecurity indicators to derive
a food deprivation scale. We also based our model on the public health applications of
Bartolucci et al. (2010, 2012), who used M-IRT to identify the health status latent traits of
elderly patients who currently receive healthcare assistance in Italy.
6A principal components analysis of political systems of corruption related to democratization levels of
American state is investigated, for example, in Hill (2003).
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Using a sample of more than 6600 enterprises in 26 countries of Eastern Europe and
Central Asia taken from the BEEPS survey, we assess whether the latent classes of corruption
are useful in restricting the field under investigation to more specific aspects of corruption,
which characterize the endemic level in a specific country context. We focus particularly
on the assignment of each firm at country level, because our (four) latent classes express
a growing quantitative contribution to the corruption level of a country. Our findings also
indicate the robust association of our identified latent classes of administrative and political
corruption with the indexes of (mainly) administrative corruption derived from BEEPS and
TI, respectively. As an illustrative example, we use the magnitude of the firm scores to
estimate the effects of firms’ competitiveness on the probabilistic response of corruption
yielded by the identified latent classes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the evolution of corruption in
transition economies and illustrates the dataset we use. Section 3 discusses our empirical
framework for quantifying the number of latent classes and presents our main results. Sec-
tion 4 provides the robustness of these results, comparing the aggregate indices of the firms’
components of corruption with those extracted directly from BEEPS and TI. An illustrative
example is reported in Section 5, in which we review the relationship between firms’ com-
petitiveness and corruption using the identified corruption components. Some conclusions
are then drawn in Section 6.
2 Some basic facts and data used to explore corruption
in transition economies
In this section, we first describe the patterns of corruption in transition economies by
using the country indices derived from the relevant literature and provided by international
organizations. We then discuss the items of the survey, making a distinction between ad-
ministrative corruption and political corruption.
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2.1 Preliminaries: corrupt attitudes in transition economies
Since 1990, a large number of post-communist countries of Eastern Europe have un-
dergone the transition to a market economy (i.e., transition economies). These countries
were characterized by a propensity toward economic reform, focused on macroeconomic sta-
bilization, price and trade liberalization, privatization, and the establishment of the legal
foundations of a market economy (Anderson and Gray, 2006).
Ex-post economic assessments of these reforms have been contrasting. For example,
Falcetti et al. (2006) found a positive cross-country correlation between market-oriented
reforms and the economic growth rate during the transition process. Conversely, Hodgson
(2006) showed that many countries underwent economic recession in the first few years of
transition, due to the difficulties in changing institutions quickly. More interestingly for
our analysis, Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Johnson et al. (1999) and Rose-Ackerman (1999)
observed previously a unheard-of increase in corruption in the first decade of transition,
correlated with a negative economic cycle, partly explained by an unchanged political class
which persisted in following old habits in newly reformed market institutions.
Figure 1: Patterns of corruption in transition economies
Notes: Corruption is inversely expressed in terms of good government and ranges from 0 to 10, where 10 represents highest level of good government.
Figure 1 (solid line) shows the patterns of good government from 1999 to 2009 in a
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sample of 27 transition economies, which are inversely measured with respect to the scale of
corruption perception indices. Good government ranges from 0 to 10, where 10 represents
the highest level for this index and is widely used for practical applications at country level
(Bardhan, 1997; Nowak, 2001; Svensson, 2005). We exploit the country classification of the
institutional reforms in 2000 by Davoodi and Abed (2000) to cluster countries with advanced
institutional reforms (dotted line in Figure 1) with respect to countries with less advanced
reforms (dashed line in Figure 1)7.
As expected, Figure 1 shows higher good government (i.e., smaller perceived corruption)
in those countries, which underwent an advanced institutional reform season although, at
least until 2009, these patterns are stable and do not show particular improvements. They
are in line with the argument of Nowak (2001) who explained the persistence of corruption
in transition economies according to their Communist roots: that is, although the effects
of institutional reforms led to evident improvements in the good government of transition
countries, they generally seem to be arrested in the last years.
More interestingly, we would know whether good government - or inversely corruption
patterns - are associated with the anti-corruption policies, which were applied and largely
publicized in some countries. For example, Bulgaria changed important laws to reform the
public administration, including a Civil Service Act (Open Society Institute, 2002). The
Czech Republic also addressed this problem in its Combating Corruption Program, based on
three principal anti-corruption measures: (i) an educational program to increase awareness of
corruption and the ability of civil servants to fight it; (ii) an extensive public administration
anti-corruption plan, involving the majority of public offices (e.g., police, health services);
(iii) extensive reform of political parties. We also include Turkey in our sample, even though
it is not an economy geographically in transition, because it underwent a transition to the
market economy similar to countries in Eastern Europe. In fact, Turkey was obliged to adopt
anti-corruption policies as part of the actions within the Emergency Action Plan (Memisolu
7We follow Davoodi and Abed (2000) including in the cluster of countries with an advanced institutional
reforming season Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic
and Slovenia; all the other transition economies are included in the less advanced cluster of countries. The
threshold was chosen on the basis of a BEEPS structural reform index. In particular, their inclusion is
based on eight indicators of reforms: i) large-scale privatizations, ii) small-scale privatizations, iii) enterprise
restructuring, iv) price liberalization, v) trade and exchange rate systems, vi) competition policies, vii)
banking reform, viii) securities markets and non-bank financial institutions.
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and Durguin, 2008)8 to achieve the objectives required for pre-accession to the European
Union.
We observe that, with the exception of the Czech Republic, the implemented reforms
have mainly focused on administrative corruption, and virtually little progress has been
made towards fighting political corruption at the level of government, Parliament (National
Assembly) and political parties in countries subjected to this type of corruption. Note
that, in this context, one way of fighting political corruption is through the voting process,
replacing the corrupt government or ”revolutions”under the flag of legality. In the latter
case, interesting examples of corrupt governments in transition economies removed after
accusations of corruption have been the ”Rose Revolution” in Georgia and the ”Orange
Revolution” in Ukraine.
Figure 2: Patterns of corruption in countries which applied anti-corruption policies
Notes: Corruption is inversely expressed in terms of good government ranges from 0 to 10, where 10 represents highest level of good government.
Before 2002 no data were available for Georgia (Source, Transparency International, various years).
Figure 2 refers explicitly to those countries which accepted anti-corruption reforms, with
data based on CPI. The figure shows that improvements in good government were only mod-
8The structure of Emergency Action Plan is based on: i) the creation of new institutions to establish the
principle of the state of law and to protect individual rights, ii) enforcement of access to information and
documents held by the administration in public management, and iii) the rise in ethical standards in public
administration, through the prevention of gifts or advantages offered, information supply, transparency,
participation, accountability of managers, and declaration of property.
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erate. In particular, the reforms were totally ineffective in combating corruption in Bulgaria
whereas, in a comparison between Georgia and Ukraine, Figure 2 shows an improvement in
good government in Georgia, and a persistence of the pre-communist situation in the level
of corruption in Ukraine.
This preliminary evidence emphasizes the idea of corruption as a complex and latent
phenomenon, which involves government institutions at different stages of public duties.
This limits the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies which can identify and intervene in
the various sources of corruption.
2.2 Data by firm survey
Our analysis mainly uses data on corrupt attitudes perceived by firms, although we refer
to CPI data on the occurrences. As anticipated, the data come from BEEPS, jointly im-
plemented by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the
World Bank. Surveys were carried out yearly from 1999, focusing on several substantial is-
sues affecting firms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. For example, the surveys included
questions about firms’ sales and their investment, innovations, and access to financing. In ad-
dition, several questions regarded law and business regulation, taxation, and the qualitative
perception of the business environment.
A section of BEEPS also addressed government policies and practices and includes items
of perceived corruption. Note that one of the most interesting features of the survey is the
sample design used to collect the data. Based on the perception of managers and related
to the line of business in which they operate, these subjective measures of corrupt practices
covered the direct experience of the interviewees, limiting measurement bias which depends
on unverified knowledge (e.g., hearsay)9. The survey also contains firms’ characteristics, such
as sector and size in terms of employees.
To verify the existence of various types of corruption, we used data from the survey carried
out in 2002, because the questionnaire for that year does not contain many missing in items
linked with the problem of corruption. Our dataset concerns 6667 firms in 26 countries (see,
Table 1).
9For a discussion of this topic, see Fries et al. (2003).
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Table 1: List of countries and firms
Country Number of firms Percentage of firms
Yugoslavia 250 3.75
FYROM 170 2.55
Albania 170 2.55
Croatia 187 2.80
Turkey 514 7.71
Bosnia and Herzegovina 182 2.73
Slovenia 188 2.82
Poland 500 7.50
Ukraine 463 6.94
Belarus 250 3.75
Hungary 250 3.75
Czech Republic 268 4.02
Slovak Republic 170 2.55
Romania 255 3.82
Bulgaria 250 3.75
Moldova 174 2.61
Latvia 176 2.64
Lithuania 200 3.00
Estonia 170 2.55
Georgia 174 2.61
Armenia 171 2.56
Kazakhstan 250 3.75
Azerbaijan 170 2.55
Uzbekistan 260 3.90
Russia 506 7.59
Tajikistan 176 2.64
Kyrgyz Republic 173 2.59
Total 6,667 100.00
Because our aim was to characterize the various dimensions of corruption from the ques-
tionnaire items, we exploited the potential of this questionnaire, which distinguishes a priori
two types of corruption linked with administrative and political futures, as proposed in the
economic literature starting from Scott (1972) and developed by Bardhan (1997, 2006) and
Warren (2004). As described in Fries et al. (2003), political corruption describes how firms
influence the content and application of specific laws and regulations to the benefit of a
narrow private interest, rather than the broad public interest; administrative corruption is
often associated with the arbitrary application of existing laws and regulations.
The questionnaire items classified by Fries et al. (2003) is listed in Table 2. Looking
at the definition of administrative corruption, we select ten items covering a wide range of
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futures related with corrupt practices. Two items account for corruption in public services
and permits, which are closely related with the fixed costs of doing business. A second set
of items is linked with bribes, with the aim of weakening the activities of public inspections
within a firm or related to inspections of buildings, health and environmental safety. The
remaining sub-set of items describes informal payments required to deal with the public
administration, imports and customs, courts and tax collection.
As regards political corruption, we present a set of six items10. In particular, managers
responded concerning private payments or gifts, made with the aim of affecting the votes
of parliamentarians and government officials on specific laws, the contents of government
decrees, or decisions of elected officials. In addition, private payments or gifts were considered
to influence the decisions of criminal and civilian courts, together with benefits to central
bank officials in influencing central bank policies and decisions.
Table 2: Description of dataset
How often would they make payments/gifts for the following purposes? (proxies of administrative corruption):
item01 (1) to get connected to and maintain public services (e.g., electricity and telephone lines)
item02 (2) to obtain business licenses and permits
item03 (3) to obtain government contracts
item04 (4) to deal with occupational health and safety inspections
item05 (5) to deal with fire and building inspections
item06 (6) to deal with environmental inspections
item07 (7) to deal with taxes and tax collection
item08 (8) to deal with customs/imports
item09 (9) to deal with courts
item10 (10) to influence the contents of new legislation rules, decrees, etc.
To what extent have the following practices had a direct impact on your business? (proxies of political corruption):
item11 (11) private payments/gifts or other benefits to parliamentarians to affect their votes
item12 (12) private payments/gifts or other benefits to government officials to affect the content of government decrees
item13 (13) private payments/gifts or other benefits to judges to affect the decisions of criminal court cases
item14 (14) private payments/gifts or other benefits to judges to affect the decisions in commercial cases
item15 (15) private payments/gifts or other benefits to central bank officials to affect central bank policies and decisions
item16 (16) illegal contributions to political parties and/or election campaigns to affect the decisions of elected officials
Notes: Data come from Business Environment Survey (BEEPS), jointly implemented by data from the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD) and the World Bank.
3 Empirical framework
In this section, we discuss an LC model which accounts for the dimensionality issue of
corruption. Based on the constrained version of the LC model, we view corruption as a
10See also Svensson (2005) for a discussion on the definition of political corruption.
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latent phenomenon identified by the conditional probabilities of success of each item, as the
respondent is in a certain latent class. Statistical information criteria are mainly used in the
choice of the number of latent classes, and the estimates are based on the BEEPS dataset.
3.1 The model
We describe the M-IRT model proposed by Bartolucci (2007). Let yj denote the response
variable for the j − th item of the questionnaire, which corresponds to the case of a binary
item (yj = 0, 1). We denote by n the number of firms in the sample and assume that they
respond to J items which measure D different latent traits and that every item measures
only one latent trait11. This model allows us to investigate the correlation between the latent
dimensions of corruption. Here, n = 4610 and J = 16, and on the basis of the items defined
in the dataset, we expect at least two different dimensions, so that D ≥ 2.
The model we adopt is based on the following parameterization of the conditional prob-
abilities of success λj|c as a logit function:
logit(λj|c) = γj
(∑
d
δjdθcd − βj
)
, j = 1, . . . , J, (1)
where, with reference to item j,
∣∣λj|c∣∣ = |(p(yj)| firm is in class c)| and δjd is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if j ∈ Jd and to 0 otherwise, Jd being the subset of items measuring
dimension d; θcd is a measure of the latent trait (dimension d) for subjects in latent class c,
and βj indicates the difficulty parameter as the overall tendency to respond 0 to item j (for
a discussion, see Bartolucci 2007). Parameters γj may be set equal to a fixed value following
one-parameter logistic parameterization (1PL) or left unconstrained and thus estimated as
in two-parameter logistic parameterization (2PL). In the second case, the model allows for
a different sensitivity of the item measuring the latent trait. The relative importance of
the difference between a firm’s trait level and item threshold is therefore determined by the
magnitude of the discriminatory power of the item.
11When the number of partitions Jd is equal to the number of used items (to define the latent trait), the
IRT model is equivalent to an LC model.
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Under the assumption of local independence12, the distribution of Y for subjects in the
c− th latent class is:
p(y|c) = p(Y = y|Θ = θc) =
∏
j
λ
yj
j|c(1− λj|c)1−yj , (2)
where p(Y = y|Θ = θc) is the conditional probability that a subject with latent vector θ
provides to response configuration y. Through a finite mixture, we can express the distri-
bution of Y as:
p(y) =
∑
c
p(y|c)pic, (3)
where pic = p(Θ = θc) are the weights corresponding to each latent class.
The log-likelihood function, which is used to estimate the above multidimensional LC
Rash model, is thus:
`(θ) =
∑
y
n(y) log(p(y)). (4)
where θ is the vector containing all identifiable parameters of the model and p(y) is computed
as a function of θ. In particular, to make the parameters identifiable, we use the constraint
βj = 0, j ∈ D, when the parameterization is of 1PL type, and βj = 0, γj = 1, j ∈ Jd when
it is of 2PL type, where D = j1, ..., jd, and jd denotes a specific element of Jd.
The maximization of `(θ) may be performed by the EM algorithm (Dempster et al.,
1977). See also Bartolucci (2007) and Bartolucci et al. (2012), for details. Let us assume
that we know frequencies m(y, c) of the contingency table in which these subjects are cross-
classified according to response configuration (y) and latent class (c). We can thus estimate
θ by maximizing the so-called complete log-likelihood as:
`∗(θ) =
∑
y
∑
c
m(y, c) log p(c,y). (5)
Therefore, at the E-step, we compute the expected value of mˆ(y, c) for each y and c, given
n(y), and at the M-step we maximize the complete log-likelihood, in which every frequency
12Following the local independence assumption, the response variables are conditionally independent, given
the latent variables.
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m(y, c) is replaced by the corresponding expected value mˆ(y, c). The EM alternates these
two steps until convergence.
The estimated parameters from the EM algorithm are then used to compare (two) mul-
tidimensional models. The hypothesis test is of type:
H0 : g(θ) = 0 (6)
where g(θ) is a vector-valued function and 0 denotes a column vector of zeros of suitable
dimensions. For testing the best model for the data at hand, we use the likelihood ratio
(LR) test statistic,
LR = 2
∑
y
n(y) log
[
pˆD(y)
pˆD−1(y)
]
(7)
where pˆD(y) refers to the assumed model with D different dimensions and pˆD−1(y) to the
constrained model with D− 1 dimensions. When the response probability is modeled by an
M-IRT model, the resulting LR statistic has a χ2 distribution with a number of degrees of
freedom equal to the difference between the number of parameters of the full multidimen-
sional and restricted models, where we merge two distinct dimensions.
A crucial point for the identification of latent traits of corruption is the strength of the
correlation between two distinct dimensions. We compute this correlation as:
ρˆd1,d2 =
C∑
c=1
θˆc,d1 θˆc,d2pic (8)
where θc,d1 and θc,d2 are the standardized estimates of the latent trait referring to two specific
dimensions, d1 and d2, for subjects in latent class c (e.g., pˆic is the estimated weight of this
class with c = 1, ..., C). After identifying the latent classes on the basis of θˆcd and ρˆd1,d2 , as
a final step, we compute the firm’s trait scores by using the expected value of frequencies
mˆ(y, c) estimated at the E-step, defined as:
mˆy|c = n(y)
p(y|c)pic∑
h p(y|h)pih
. (9)
We then build a binary variable, which identifies latent classes and attributes 1 to the firm
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with the highest expected value of frequencies in that class, and 0 otherwise.
3.2 Model selection
The choice of the number of classes in the multidimensional LC Rash model is crucial
for model identification. Although selection is mainly based on information criteria, we
complement this choice with indices measuring goodness of fit. The most frequently used
index is the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Schwarz, 1978), which is based on the
index:
BIC = −2ˆ`+m log(n), (10)
where ˆ` is the maximum value of log-likelihood test statistics and m is the number of
free parameters. Another widely used criterion is the Akaike information criterion (AIC),
(Akaike, 1973), which is based on the index:
AIC = −2ˆ`+ 2 log(n), . (11)
Two extended versions of the AIC index were proposed by Andrews and Currim (2003),
which include different weights in estimating the log-likelihood function. In the first case,
AIC is penalized with a factor 3 instead of 2 (AIC3); penalties in AIC are included in
models with a larger number of parameters to define a consistent Akaike information criteria
(e.g., CAIC).
We also use measures based on the capacity of the model to fit the data. These measures
are based on R2entropy and variance R
2
variance (Magidson and Vermunt, 2001), the estimated
proportion of classification errors (E)13, and the Average Weight of Evidence (AWE). In
particular, the last index is built by adding a third dimension to the BIC index that, makes
the performance of individual classification within groups more efficient, as argued in Banfield
and Raftery (1993). The formal specification is:
AWE = −2ˆ`c + 2m
[
2
3
+ log(n)
]
(12)
13Unlike the other measure, E proves model accuracy when the values are close to zero.
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where ˆ`c is the log-likelihood classification (Biernacki and Govaert, 1998). Table 3 lists the
log-likelihood statistics and classification statistics for a number of predetermined latent
classes, from 2 to 8.
Table 3: Latent class selection
Log-likelihood statistics
Log-likelihood (log LL) BIC (log LL) AIC (log LL) AIC3 (log LL) CAIC (log LL)
Class1 -46461.658 93058.2930 92955.3173 92971.3173 93074.2930
Class2 -40417.9682 81114.3238 80901.9364 80934.9364 81147.3238
Class3 -38985.0967 78391.9925 78070.1933 78120.1933 78441.9925
Class4 -382.66.8741 77242.3707 76701.7482 76785.7482 77326.3707
Class5 -38204.7666 77261.5674 76611.5331 76712.5331 77362.5674
Class6 -38404.3510 77373.9129 76942.7020 77009.7020 77440.9129
Class7 -38171.2934 77338.0329 76578.5869 76696.5869 77456.0329
Class8 -38148.8201 77436.4980 76567.6402 76702.6402 77571.4980
Goodness of LC model fit
E R2entropy Standard R
2
variance AWE
lc index
Class1 0.0000 10.000 10.000 -46461.6586 93241.2687
Class2 0.0374 0.8712 0.8922 -40829.3882 82314.5512
Class3 0.0532 0.8630 0.8754 -39674.2046 80342.0076
Class4 0.0613 0.8593 0.8633 -39214.4170 79760.2558
Class5 0.1283 0.7791 0.7547 -39787.7568 81244.7587
Class6 0.1432 0.7623 0.7295 -39945.4201 81897.9089
Class7 0.1845 0.7214 0.6728 -40429.0881 83203.0681
Class8 0.1974 0.7070 0.6541 -40630.1816 83943.0787
Notes: Upper part of table lists Log-likelihood statistics and estimates Log-likelihood function. Proposed Log-likelihood statistics are: Bayesian
Information Criteria (BIC), Akaike information criterion (AIC), Akaike information criterion with 3 as penalizing factor (AIC3), and Consistent
Akaike information criterion (CAIC). Bottom part of table lists several measures and statistics based on ability of model to fit data, and include:
estimated proportion of classification errors (E), two pseudo R-square measures (R2entropy) and (R
2
variance), and Average Weight of Evidence
(AWE).
This analysis strongly suggests that the optimal number of latent classes is 4, as shown
by the BIC index and CAIC. This result is also confirmed by the measures of goodness of fit,
reported at the end of the table. We note that the estimated proportion of classified error E
doubles passing from 4 to 5 latent classes, whereas the two pseudo R2 rapidly decrease from
4 to 5 classes. Consistently, the AWE statistic reports a minimum value at 4 classes.
3.3 Results
We now summarize the main results of the multidimensional approach to corruption. As
described in the previous section, the procedure consists of running a sequence of nested
models which begins with an LC model, in which the number of dimensions is equal to
the number of selected items (unconstrained model). An analytical overview of the results
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from the hierarchical clustering analysis is given in Table 4. The third column lists the
combinations of items for each of the sequential steps; the fourth and fifth columns list the
deviance from the initial LC model and from the previous model, respectively. Lastly, the
p−value of LR test statistics appears in the last column.
Table 4: Output of hierarchical cluster analysis
Seq. Dim. Clusters Deviance LR-test P-value
1 15 1.3.4.5.6.7.9.10.11.12.13.14.15.16.(2.8) 0.194 0.194 0.908
2 14 1.3.4.5.6.7.11.12.13.14.15.16.(2.8).(9.10) 0.500 0.306 0.858
3 13 1.3.4.7.11.12.13.14.15.16.(2.8).(9.10).(5.6) 1.109 0.609 0.737
4 12 1.3.4.7.11.12.14.16.(2.8).(9.10).(5.6).(13.15) 1.789 0.680 0.712
5 11 3.4.11.12.14.16.(2.8).(9.10).(5.6).(13.15).(1.7) 2.690 0.901 0.637
6 10 3.4.11.12.14.(2.8).(9.10).(5.6).(1.7).(13.15.16) 3.939 1.249 0.535
7 9 3.4.11.12.14.(9.10).(5.6).(13.15.16).(1.2.7.8) 6.185 2.246 0.325
8 8 3.4.14.(9.10).(5.6).(13.15.16).(1.2.7.8).(11.12) 9.666 3.481 0.175
9 7 3.4.(9.10).(5.6).(1.2.7.8).(11.12).(13.14.15.16) 13.296 3.630 0.163
10 6 3.(9.10).(4.5.6).(1.2.7.8).(11.12).(13.14.15.16) 18.088 4.792 0.091
11 5 (9.10).(4.5.6).(1.2.3.7.8).(11.12).(13.14.15.16) 23.668 5.580 0.061
12 4 (9.10).(4.5.6).(1.2.3.7.8).(11.12.13.14.15.16) 42.936 19.268 0.000
13 3 (4.5.6).(1.2.3.7.8.9.10).(11.12.13.14.15.16) 84.831 41.895 0.000
14 2 (1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10).(11.12.13.14.15.16) 207.149 122.318 0.000
15 1 (1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.10.11.12.13.14.15.16) 3059.953 2852.805 0.000
Notes: Column (1) lists the sequence of steps (seq), (2) the number of dimensions for each step (dim), and (3) combinations of items in each
dimension for each sequential step (Clusters). Deviance for each step (Deviance), Likelihood ratio test (LR-test), and p− values are presented
in last three columns. For classifications and definitions of items, see Table 2.
Table 4 shows the presence of multidimensionality, keeping five significant dimensions, as
also confirmed by the hierarchical clustering analysis in Figure 3. Differences within types of
corruption arise from the items of administrative corruption which characterize dimensions
1, 2 and 3; items of political corruption are those of dimensions 4 and 5.
Looking at the item definitions (Table 2), we can progressively identify the dimensions
of administrative corruption as:
• bureaucrats’ need to influence legislation rugulations and the timing of applications of
law;
• unofficial payments for inspections in occupational health and safety, fire and buildings,
and environmental works;
• application of government contracts, business licenses and contracts, public services
and general issues of taxation.
The items that cluster political corruption are:
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Figure 3: Dendrogram
Notes: Classifications and definitions of items are listed in Table 2.
• corruption by firms to influence the contents of specific laws and regulations;
• corruption to influence decisions of criminal courts and commercial cases, and decisions
or policies of the officials of the central bank.
Table 5: Estimation of conditional probabilities and discriminatory power of items of selected
model
Dim. Item Class1 Class2 Class3 Class4 γ
3 item1 0.044 0.194 0.433 0.777 1.000
3 item2 0.102 0.417 0.723 0.934 1.118
3 item3 0.055 0.248 0.528 0.848 1.057
2 item4 0.031 0.144 0.644 0.881 1.000
2 item5 0.046 0.205 0.735 0.919 1.001
2 item6 0.012 0.080 0.596 0.887 1.192
3 item7 0.075 0.371 0.705 0.937 1.208
3 item8 0.047 0.226 0.507 0.842 1.086
1 item9 0.011 0.206 0.371 0.877 1.000
1 item10 0.011 0.139 0.246 0.730 0.850
4 item11 0.005 0.657 0.035 0.731 1.000
4 item12 0.008 0.738 0.055 0.799 0.979
5 item13 0.002 0.649 0.038 0.822 1.000
5 item14 0.008 0.800 0.113 0.900 0.895
5 item15 0.002 0.499 0.035 0.686 0.861
5 item16 0.008 0.613 0.081 0.759 0.752
Notes: Column (1) lists the dimension for each item (dimension), (2) item code (item). Conditional probabilities and the discriminatory power
(γ) of items of selected model. For classifications and definitions of the items, see Table 2.
Table 5 lists the estimated conditional probabilities of the LC model for each selected
item, together with the estimates of γ. It shows that there is a dissimilar order between the
first 10 items (administrative corruption) and the last 6 (political corruption). For a clearer
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interpretation, we refer to the components of breadth and depth of corruption as defined by
Mocan (2008), in which the former describes the extent to which corruption is widespread
in a country, and the latter describes the extent of each LC component affecting corruption.
The results indicate that administrative corruption items follow an increasing order across
the four latent classes, and the last six political corruption items show higher conditional
probabilities, regarding latent class 2 and, partly, latent class 4. In addition, we find a lower
level of the conditional probabilities in latent class 1, which achieves a (modest) influence in
items 2 and 7 (see Table 5), associated with administrative corruption. This implies that the
estimated level of corruption in latent class 1, mainly identified by tax evasion or improving
access to public services, does not seem to be an obstacle for the business environment. That
is, although we postulate that administrative corruption imposes a burden on firms in terms,
for example, of tax bribes, estimates by conditional probability of a low corruption enables us
to identify this latent class as referring to unconstrained physiological level of administrative
corruption.
Thus, as emerges from this discussion, a crucial point of the present study is the in-
terpretation of latent classes. Useful suggestions for this come jointly from the estimate of
dimensions on different classes and from the correlation measures between identified dimen-
sions (Table 6).
Table 6: Estimation of θ and correlation among dimensions
Dim1 Dim2 Dim3 Dim4 Dim5 Weight
Impact of dimensions on classes
Class1 -3.072 -3.027 -4.498 -6.372 -5.326 0.439
Class2 -1.427 -1.352 -1.350 0.615 0.651 0.108
Class3 -0.269 1.020 -0.526 -3.233 -3.311 0.313
Class4 1.247 2.425 1.961 1.527 1.000 0.140
Correlation among dimensions
Dim1 Dim2 Dim3 Dim4 Dim5
Dim1 1.000
Dim2 0.989 1.000
Dim3 0.990 0.959 1.000
Dim4 0.747 0.645 0.834 1.000
Dim5 0.676 0.563 0.773 0.994 1.000
Notes: First part of table lists standardized estimate of latent trait level (θc,d) for each class c and dimension d, with estimated weight in each
class (pic). The second part lists correlation among dimensions.
The analysis identifies three main results. First, estimated parameter θcd in equation (1)
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formally identifies the four latent classes according to their different dimensions. As shown
in the top part of Table 6, within the four latent classes, we confirm that all five dimensions
are increasingly ordered, with the lowest values in class 1 and the highest in class 4. This
also means that we can order corruption according to depth of the latent classes.
Second, as a brief index of how widespread corruption is in firms, we observe that most
firms (43.9%) belong to class 1, followed by class 3 (31.3%), whereas the smallest class is
class 2, with only 10.8%. The remaining firms are in class 4 (14%).
Third, looking at the values of the dimensions in each class, we identify class 3 as the
one with issues in administrative corruption, and class 2 with characteristics of political
corruption. In more detail, and according to the results shown in Table 5, since dimension 2
prevails in class 3, we can identify this LC as administrative corruption, as more linked with
public inspections, other than taxes, licenses and permits. In addition, although the items
of political corruption may partly affect the results of class 4, the prevalence in that class of
the effects of administrative corruption dimensions 1, 2 and 3 shows that the highest level of
corruption is more associated with general administrative corruption. Figure 4, summarizes
the identification process derived from the empirical framework.
4 Confirmatory analysis
In this section, we ascertained the robustness of the results by comparing our country cor-
ruption rankings with those obtained from perception measure of administrative corruption
extracted from a direct item of the BEEPS and CPI ranking.
We use the expected value of posterior probabilities, as estimated by the E-step, to define
a binary variable, where each firm is attributed 1 in the latent class for the highest level of the
expected value of probability, and zero otherwise. This new variable identifies the perceived
prevalence of corrupt practices for a firm classified in one of the LCs.
This analysis not only allows us to identify different types of corruption and their quantit-
ative influence but also, in line with the definition of breadth of corruption by Mocan (2008),
to ascertain how widespread corruption is in a country, and thus to evaluate its importance
in Eastern European countries. For this aim, we use our previous firms’ binary variable to
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Figure 4: Identification of corruption indices
Notes: Analytic description of latent classes and dimensions, according to results of Table 6. Continuous vertical arrow (right) measures scale of
corruption, from 0 (absence of corruption) to high.
build a corruption index for each LC at country level.
4.1 Comparison with synthetic BEEPS corruption index
We compare our estimates with the perceived index of corruption, directly obtained from
the BEEPS dataset; in this item, firms respond to the following question: Is it common
for firms in your line of business to have to make irregular additional payments or gifts to
get things done as regards customs, taxes, licenses, regulation services etc.?. The answer in-
cludes six modalities on a growing scale of perceived corruption (Never, Seldom, Sometimes,
Frequently, Usually, Always). However, for empirical purpose, we rescale it into four modal-
ities, considering both the responses Seldom and Sometimes and Frequently and Usually ; the
new corruption index is thus mentioned as absence, low, medium and high, and increases the
quantitative perception of corruption in line with the estimated LC. Note that this synthetic
variable is a measure of administrative corruption, as we expect a strong association with
administrative LCs (1, 3 and 4), and a non-significant association with the class identified
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as political corruption.
Table 7 lists the results of the LR test statistic which assumes an independence hypothesis
between each estimated LC and that concerning administrative corruption, directly obtained
from the BEEPS for each country.
Our estimates of LCs 1 and 4 appear to be very well associated with the directly per-
ceived administrative corruption index. We show the novelty of the proposed corruption
measure characterizing other latent classes identified. In the class 3, the data reject the
independence hypothesis at 5% level between our firm score variable and that obtained us-
ing medium corruption, extracted directly from the BEEPS. Only in a few countries, we
can note a non-significant association. This result strengthens our findings, indicating that,
although the index built with a direct item of the perceived administrative corruption in
BEEPS, its specificity generates the clear-cut effect of public inspections and tax evasion
in some countries, with respect to general administrative corruption (e.g., Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Hungary, Latvia, Uzbekistan and Yugoslavia). Finally, column 2 lists the result of a
”false experiment” specification in which low administrative corruption, as extracted from
the BEEPS, is expected independent from political corruption variable estimated in LC 2.
We find confirmation that administrative corruption and political corruption are not related,
and that, independently from the level of corruption, these two components affect country
corruption differently.
4.2 Comparison with CPI
There is substantial debate regarding the use of corruption indices, because they have
stimulated many cross-country studies and come up with interesting findings concerning the
causes and consequences of corrupt activities (for a recent discussion, see Neumann and
Graeff 2010). Among the most prominent indices measuring corruption at country level, the
CPI - along with the corruption indicator by Kaufmann et al. (2003) - is the most frequently
cited in the relative literature. In contrast with its widespread diffusion, it is questionable
the general validity of such indices, because the economic literature has shown that the use
of this index of corruption often reaches very different conclusions (Dreher and Schneider,
2006).
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Table 7: Tests for independence between identified latent classes and direct BEEPS measures
of corruption
Physiological Political Administrative Administrative
administrative corruption corruption Corruption
corruption (inspections)
VS VS VS VS
BEEPS index of BEEPS index of BEEPS index of BEEPS index of
corruption absence corruption low corruption medium corruption high
Albania 213.708 * 0.811 57.638 * 101.677 *
(0.000) (0.368) (0.016) (0.001)
Armenia 172.723 * 0.064 49.305 * 58.879 *
(0.000) (0.801) (0.026) (0.015)
Azerbaijan 370.101 * 0.055 113.989 * 49.467 *
(0.000) (0.815) (0.001) (0.026)
Belarus 321.844 * 15.058 126.818 * 159.203 *
(0.000) (0.220) (0.000) (0.000)
Bosnia & Herzegovina 688.497 * 12.560 429.223 * 211.593 *
(0.000) (0.262) (0.000) (0.000)
Bulgaria 412.088 * 22.689 0.156 226.317 *
(0.000) (0.132) (0.693) (0.000)
Croatia 202.493 * 82.793 * 0.554 119.937 *
(0.000) (0.004) (0.457) (0.001)
Czech Republic 664.122 * 10.352 392.161 * 137.012 *
(0.000) (0.309) (0.000) (0.000)
Estonia 599.359 * 35.750 373.577 * 116.024 *
(0.000) (0.059) (0.000) (0.001)
FYROM 600.870 * 0.756 365.622 * 80.978 *
(0.000) (0.385) (0.000) (0.004)
Georgia 496.622 * 0.004 265.603 * 122.376 *
(0.000) (0.949) (0.000) (0.000)
Hungary 258.069 * 50.323 * 12.937 152.746 *
(0.000) (0.025) (0.255) (0.000)
Kazakhstan 255.949 * 29.099 45.286 * 71.213 *
(0.000) (0.088) (0.033) (0.008)
Kyrgyzstan 268.411 * 0.169 92.779 * 91.552 *
(0.000) (0.681) (0.002) (0.002)
Latvia 428.327 * 54.366 * 16.125 75.011 *
(0.000) (0.020) (0.204) (0.006)
Lithuania 323.478 * 0.445 143.077 * 65.670 *
(0.000) (0.505) (0.000) (0.010)
Moldova 170.909 * 0.546 52.514 * 59.833 *
(0.000) (0.460) (0.022) (0.014)
Poland 417.191 * 27.214 161.722 * 120.334 *
(0.000) (0.099) (0.000) (0.001)
Romania 385.822 * 20.116 182.290 * 55.487 *
(0.000) (0.156) (0.000) (0.018)
Russia 399.378 * 23.117 42.141 * 114.458 *
(0.000) (0.128) (0.040) (0.001)
Slovak Republic 81.053 * 0.107 113.735 * 20.003
(0.004) (0.744) (0.001) (0.157)
Slovenia 448.439 * 0.612 301.775 * 42.201 *
(0.000) (0.434) (0.000) (0.040)
Tajikistan 389.076 * 11.664 199.459 * 54.259 *
(0.000) (0.280) (0.000) (0.020)
Turkey 525.004 * 59.588 * 123.636 * 190.284 *
(0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000)
Ukraine 941.732 * 0.866 812.055 * 52.655 *
(0.000) (0.352) (0.000) (0.022)
Uzbekistan 479.520 * 0.295 10.885 149.778 *
(0.000) (0.587) (0.297) (0.000)
Yugoslavia 292.500 * 0.849 34.337 62.623 *
(0.000) (0.357) (0.064) (0.012)
Notes: Independence test is likelihood ratio statistic test at the country level. Asterisks: 5% significance level. All tests have as null hypothesis
independence between our estimated country score indicator of corruption and those corresponding to BEEPS.
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To validate our estimates, we aggregated firms classified in one latent class of the binary
variable at country level and obtained a score index of corruption for each country (Table 8).
Note that, whereas in CPI the maximum value of the index represents the best government
performance, our scores are measured in reverse. We then use these scores to obtain a new
corruption ranking of countries in each latent class, and compare this index with CPI. This
comparison is particularly important, because it not only suggests the external validity of
our country ranking, but may also indicate the dimension of the bias with a synthetic index
and the validity of the tool for measuring corruption.
Table 8: Country corruption scores and rankings
Country Physiological Political Administrative Administrative CPI (2002)
administrative corruption corruption corruption index
corruption (inspections)
Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking
Albania 29.1 (21) 43.3 (12) 100.0 (21) 42.5 (17) 41.6 (15)
Croatia 70.4 (5) 23.1 (3) 40.8 (3) 49.8 (18) 63.3 (8)
Turkey 53.5 (14) 83.6 (20) 54.1 (7) 31.5 (13) 53.3 (11)
Bosnia & Herzegovina 37.7 (18) 23.5 (4) 43.1 (4) 100.0 (21) 36.6 (19)
Slovenia 100.0 (1) 60.2 (17) 37.4 (2) 15.5 (5) 100.0 (1)
Poland 77.4 (3) 30.3 (9) 58.4 (9) 17.5 (6) 66.6 (6)
Ukraine 49.4 (16) 29.5 (8) 90.4 (19) 27.0 (9) 40.0 (16)
Belarus 66.8 (8) 26.3 (7) 77.2 (15) 14.7 (3) 80.0 (4)
Czech Republic 65.6 (9) 32.8 (10) 60.1 (10) 31.8 (14) 61.6 (9)
Slovak Republic 56.8 (12) 50.1 (14) 64.9 (12) 31.9 (15) 81.6 (3)
Romania 50.3 (15) 26.2 (6) 84.8 (18) 33.2 (16) 43.3 (14)
Bulgaria 31.2 (20) 100.0 (21) 61.0 (11) 51.7 (19) 66.6 (7)
Moldova 36.6 (19) 77.4 (19) 84.2 (17) 29.6 (12) 35.0 (20)
Latvia 70.0 (6) 48.1 (13) 48.4 (5) 29.4 (11) 61.6 (10)
Lithuania 75.1 (4) 54.9 (15) 50.4 (6) 15.4 (4) 80.0 (5)
Estonia 65.2 (10) 16.9 (1) 73.5 (14) 26.3 (8) 93.3 (2)
Georgia 43.9 (17) 41.4 (11) 67.5 (13) 54.4 (20) 40.0 (17)
Kazakhstan 67.1 (7) 25.3 (5) 79.8 (16) 11.9 (1) 38.3 (18)
Azerbaijan 65.1 (11) 61.8 (18) 55.2 (8) 22.8 (7) 33.3 (21)
Uzbekistan 78.8 (2) 60.2 (16) 35.2 (1) 27.1 (10) 48.3 (12)
Russia 56.3 (13) 20.4 (2) 98.8 (20) 13.4 (2) 45.0 (13)
Notes: We exclude from the comparison Yugoslavia, FYROM, Hungary, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, since Transparency International does not
report their country measures for 2002. Ranking for each country is shown in round parenthesis. First and fifth columns are ranked in terms
of good government (100=best degree of government institutions); columns 2 to 4 are ranked in terms of highest corruption level (100=most
corrupt countries).
The hypothesis proposed is that, if our score estimates for each latent class are correct,
physiological (administrative) corruption should partly reproduce the CPI country classific-
ation. We find that rankings are in line with this hypothesis for half countries. However,
there are countries which show a very different position with respect to CPI. The explanation
suggested here, which is generally the criticism in the literature, is that the scores obtained
in other latent classes are means, among each other, at country level.
Some examples serve to clarify the idea. In Kazakhstan, the high estimated score in
public inspections leads to an increase in the mean level of corruption perception, as meas-
ured by CPI. In Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, the difference between our estimated index
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of physiological corruption and CPI can be extracted by a relatively greater perception of
political corruption. Instead, for Estonia, CPI estimates excellent ranking, and we can say
that it is associated with political corruption. More distant are the positions obtained by
the Slovak Republic and Bulgaria across the corruption index. CPI indicates that these two
countries are in positions 3 and 7 respectively. As also noted in Section 2, Bulgaria is indeed
the country with the highest political corruption greatly constrained by the inefficiencies, or
failure, of the legal system (see Delavallade 2011).
Country rankings for administrative corruption in latent classes 3 and 4 is particularly af-
fected by the level of taxation, permits and inspections, and government contracts, the latter
linked with the regulatory quality and enforcement of property rights. As argued by Tanzi
(1998), the monopolistic and discretionary power of officials in charge of authorizations or
inspections subject to regulations or taxation gives bureaucrats greater opportunities of us-
ing their public power to extract bribes. Restrictive regulation and taxation, associated with
insufficient enforcement of property rights, are strong determinants of ongoing corruption in
Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Albania.
However, the determinants of corruption are slightly different from what happened in
Bosnia with respect to the former USSR countries, in which administrative corruption is
shown to rise with weak enforcement of property rights, revealing the incapacity of the
courts to implement the law (Johnson et al., 1999). As an example of the highest levels
of administrative corruption in Bosnia, Nowak (2001) attributed to the space for corrupt
activities the post-war context, which complicated power structures and fragmented admin-
istration. Figure 5 shows the ranking of components of corruption in the Eastern Europe
countries.
5 An illustrative example of the relationship between
firm competitiveness and corruption
Many papers have been written about the determinants of corruption, with particular
emphasis on the role of market competition (Ades and Di Tella, 1999; Herzfeld and Weiss,
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Figure 5: Representation of types of corruption, by country
(a) Physiological administrative corruption
(b) Political corruption
(c) Administrative corruption (inspections)
(d) Administrative corruption (public contracts, licensing,
taxes and regulations)
Medium
Notes: Representation of corruption by country is constructed with corruption scores of Table 8. Score intervals are: i) minimum value of scores
of each index (min), ii) scores around the mean of each index (medium), and iii) maximum value of scores of each index (max).
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2003; Dreher et al., 2007). In the traditional view, the competitiveness of firms is presumed
to lead to more corruption, because they can spend part of their profits on bribes to public
officials. In particular, the model of Bliss and Di Tella (1997) finds that firm corruption
increases with the firm profitability, so that less competitive firms leave the market; in turn,
higher profitability increases bribes, consolidating a non-transparent system of bureaucrats’
behavior.
Ades and Di Tella (1997) and Clarke and Xu (2002) empirically examine the hypothesis
of a positive correlation between firm competitiveness with corruption in East European
and Central Asian countries. The results support the hypothesized mechanism that the
most competitive firms have much more money to pay bribes to bureaucrats and increase
corruption. These findings are in line with the estimates in the same relationship carried
out by Svensson (2003) and Reinikka and Svensson (2003) in the case study of Uganda.
However, this economic literature has also proposed and tested an alternative hypothesis:
if a comparative disadvantage in competitiveness exists, a firm invests in bribes in order to
stay in the market. This hypothesis was supposed by Gauthier and Reinikka (2001) and
empirically confirmed for a sample of North African countries by Delavallade (2011).
To illustrate the role of firm competitiveness as a determinant of corruption, the above
literature generally distinguishes two components, administrative and state capture indices
(in our case proxied by political corruption). One shortcoming of this approach is that one
must test whether the aggregate index of corruption can be pooled with either administrative
or state capture. It is certainly possible that using perceived corruption indicates that an
overlap between these indices exists. Our M-IRT model identifies four monotonically increas-
ing LCs associated with: i) physiological (administrative) corruption; ii) political corruption;
iii) administrative corruption associated with inspections ; and iv) administrative corruption
linked with increasing issues of public contracts, licensing taxes ad legislative regulations. Our
model allows some firms in these latent classes to be similar to others, but they comprise
statistically distinct groups and cannot be pooled. With our model, we can test whether,
and how, firm competitiveness affects the identified components of corruption by LC.
In order to re-examine the competitiveness of firms on the specific latent classes of cor-
ruption, we set up an empirical framework based on logit models, in which the dependent
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variables are the firms’ dummy variables derived from the estimates of the expected value of
frequencies (see Section 4). Competitiveness is also a qualitative variable in three modalities,
in which the highest score indicates greater competitiveness and is proxied by the increase
in sales over the previous two years (e.g., sales in 1999). We extend the concept of compet-
itiveness by also including firms which, at least, did not suffer reduced sales. This allows
us to avoid the general criticism concerning firm competitiveness linked with increases sales
(e.g. to maximize firm profits) and to substitute it with a more general aim of firm survival
in a competitive market.
The model specification includes the size of the firm (size) and of the sector in which it
operates (sector). In particular, following the results in transition economies of Hellman and
Kaufmann (2000), we assume that small firms tend to engage in administrative corruption
rather than political corruption, likely because the former is less costly. We include the
variable size dichotomized, based on full-time employees of firms calculated as ”small” (e.g.,
2 − 49, reference modality), ”medium” (e.g., 50 − 249), or ”large” (e.g., > 250), expecting
the size of the firm to affect administrative corruption negatively. In addition, this specific
literature finds conflicting evidence that corruption may differ between sectors. Industrial
sectors, in which projects involve large amounts of money or high rent-generating public
procurements, may be more open to corruption, particularly to political corruption. Thus,
we consider a dummy variable according to whether the sector of a firm is ”manufacturing”
or ”services”, the latter being the reference modality.
The coefficient estimates of the logit model are listed in Table 5. Column 2 shows the
results in terms of the odds ratio of the effect of competitiveness on the components of
corruption, as described in Figure 4. We point out three important results. Firstly, firm
competitiveness has a positive impact on countries with a physiological level of corruption
(e.g., latent class 1), but a negative impact on the highest levels of inspections in adminis-
trative corruption. Long-term survival strategy is characterized by the firms which are stable
or increase their competitiveness indicating that a representative firm has less need to bribe
bureaucrats to obtain, for example, public procurements in its line of business. We estim-
ate that countries with ”physiological” corruption do not constrain economic development,
finding that competitive (stable) firms increases the probability of having only physiological
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Table 9: Firm competitiveness and corruption: estimates
Physiological Political Administrative Administrative
administrative corruption corruption: corruption:
corruption inspections public contracts and
licensing, taxes and
legislative regulations
Size (Ref. small)
Medium 1.124 0.776 * 0.922 1.085
(0.091) (0.104) (0.078) (0.122)
Large 1.418 *** 0.926 0.771 *** 0.805
(0.128) (0.134) (0.076) (0.109)
Sector (Ref. services)
Manufacturing 1.073 0.924 1.038 0.846
(0.095) (0.128) (0.097) (0.103)
Competitiveness (Ref. decreasing)
Stable 1.396 *** 0.968 0.786 ** 0.775 *
(0.133) (0.141) (0.080) (0.111)
Increasing 1.077 0.933 0.909 1.094
(0.084) (0.112) (0.074) (0.120)
Country (Ref. Georgia)
Yugoslavia 1.044 1.580 0.766 1.008
(0.289) (0.640) (0.221) (0.307)
FYROM 1.128 1.609 0.471 ** 1.407
(0.335) (0.690) (0.161) (0.443)
Albania 0.540 ** 1.100 2.029 ** 0.723
(0.167) (0.490) (0.559) (0.237)
Croatia 2.207 *** 0.578 0.542 ** 0.819
(0.596) (0.297) (0.164) (0.256)
Turkey 1.347 2.308 *** 0.723 0.524 ***
(0.286) (0.736) (0.157) (0.129)
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.697 0.579 0.579 * 2.708 ***
(0.214) (0.316) (0.185) (0.800)
Slovenia 3.088 *** 1.555 0.470 *** 0.230 ***
(0.756) (0.572) (0.128) (0.083)
Poland 2.755 *** 0.704 0.818 0.269 ***
(0.591) (0.252) (0.179) (0.075)
Ukraine 1.150 0.714 1.666 ** 0.425 ***
(0.254) (0.262) (0.363) (0.113)
Belarus 1.942 *** 0.636 1.262 0.224 ***
(0.459) (0.267) (0.301) (0.079)
Hungary 2.364 *** 0.250 ** 1.045 0.345 ***
(0.559) (0.135) (0.252) (0.108)
Czech Republic 1.804 ** 0.804 0.895 0.537 **
(0.421) (0.316) (0.215) (0.152)
Slovak Republic 1.442 1.298 0.977 0.512 **
(0.389) (0.541) (0.270) (0.173)
Romania 1.203 0.640 1.474 0.527 **
(0.293) (0.274) (0.354) (0.154)
Bulgaria 0.623 * 2.980 *** 0.827 0.965
(0.162) (1.023) (0.208) (0.262)
Moldova 0.766 2.134 ** 1.440 0.458 **
(0.211) (0.798) (0.374) (0.152)
Latvia 2.176 *** 1.231 0.639 0.468 **
(0.603) (0.535) (0.193) (0.169)
Lithuania 2.538 *** 1.349 0.685 0.235 ***
(0.616) (0.505) (0.176) (0.085)
Estonia 1.887 ** 0.395 1.174 0.403 **
(0.518) (0.232) (0.328) (0.149)
Armenia 5.748 *** 1.077 0.344 *** 0.050 ***
(1.585) (0.446) (0.108) (0.037)
Kazakhstan 1.940 *** 0.604 1.348 0.180 ***
(0.463) (0.259) (0.323) (0.069)
Azerbaijan 1.712 * 1.636 0.807 0.386 **
(0.477) (0.676) (0.239) (0.152)
Uzbekistan 2.819 *** 1.586 0.435 *** 0.418 ***
(0.694) (0.588) (0.121) (0.131)
Russia 1.424 0.490 * 1.970 *** 0.195 ***
(0.306) (0.187) (0.420) (0.058)
Tajikistan 0.397 *** 2.168 ** 0.907 1.623 *
(0.121) (0.810) (0.244) (0.448)
Kyrgyzstan 0.619 * 1.791 1.430 0.760
(0.179) (0.698) (0.379) (0.235)
Constant 0.391 *** 0.124 *** 0.541 *** 0.379 ***
(0.080) (0.040) (0.110) (0.087)
pseudo R2 0.053 0.050 0.036 0.070
LR χ2 331.513 *** 156.335 *** 206.960 *** 260.869 ***
Log lk -2976 -1481 -2780 -1720
N 4590 4590 4590 4590
Notes: Estimates reported as odds ratios. In brackets: standard errors of estimated parameters; asterisks: significant
p-value, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗ p < 0.01. A LR test statistic for country fixed effects is shown at bottom of table.
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corruption by about 40% (e.g., 39.6%), a practice known in the corruption literature as the
”grease the wheels” hypothesis under excessive and inefficient regulation (see Dreher and
Gassebner, 2011). However, the effects of competitiveness change for components character-
ized by the highest levels of corruption. Competitive firms, which occupy a stable position
in their markets, have a significantly lower probability than less competitive ones of being
involved in corruption. This may imply that the less competitive firms resort to unofficial
payments to compensate for their competitive position, distorting the rules of competition
for the countries mainly affected by a high level of corrupt activities.
Secondly, including dummies for the specific effects of size, we find significant coeffi-
cients in the latent classes identified as the highest levels of corruption. In particular, large
enterprises reduce the propensity (e.g., odds ratio=0.771 and 0.805, for the components of
corruption 3 and 4, respectively) to seek influence in inspections, public contracts and licens-
ing taxes etc., matching previous literature on transition economies of a positive relationship
between administrative corruption and small firm size. By contrast, we do not find signi-
ficant differences between the sectors of the major lines of business in each component of
corruption.
Thirdly, we provide support for the findings of the above country classification on cor-
ruption. By exploiting CPI in 2002, we use Georgia as a reference country, because it was
the most corrupt in the context of transition economies. With few exceptions, almost all the
countries show a very low probability of incurring corruption compared with Georgia. Not
in contrast with the classification of Figure 5, we estimate that Turkey and Bulgaria have
the highest propensity for political corruption.
6 Conclusions
Bartolucci (2007) showed how the M-IRT model can be used to characterize the dimen-
sionality of items in identifying latent classes for a certain latent phenomenon. This paper
extends that work to the estimation of corruption, a latent phenomenon often measured by
synthesis of observed indices assumed to be correlated with corruption. Following this ap-
proach, the constrained version of the M-IRT model is used here to search for hidden types
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of corruption among the perceptions of firms in a large sample of transition economies. We
reject the hypothesis that items in a multidimensional perspective reproduce the distinction
between administrative and political corruption, and find that there were four LCs, with in-
creasing level of corruption. We identified of corruption and validated the results according
to a direct corruption index derived from the BEEPS and CPI rankings of TI. An illustrative
example of the relationship between firm competitiveness and the four identified LCs shows
the evident heterogeneity to interpret of the results addressed to policy implications. We
confirm for transition economies that weakly competitive firms are more tempted to resort to
bribery and bias the rules of competition, and this propensity is estimated greater in small
firms associated with administrative corruption.
The model we present should be helpful to empirical researchers in several respects. First,
in the growing body of the empirical literature of corruption, contrasting evidence appears to
be associated with the bias of an aggregate indicator, partly as an explanation of economic
or social determinants. The M-IRT model allows us to disentangle these relationships more
appropriately and in the illustration presented here, enables at least to test whether, as in
the case of firm competitiveness, this variable is associated with a particular component of
corruption. Secondly, the model can be used in social and economic contexts, where the
use of items from questionnaires can be statistically summarized, keeping the substantial
heterogeneous behaviors. In these situations, the M-IRT model can help to reduce the bias
associated with analysis which incorrectly classifies these phenomena.
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